If, as Bradbury indicated, he was unwilling to return a sentence of death when the law absolutely required him to do so, then the lesser proposition, that he was unwilling to return a death sentence, where under the law it was appropriate but not required, is obviously true. The netizens in the public are establishing numerous speculations and stories. Again, in interpreting this statute, we must ascertain the intent of the legislature by reference to the plain language of the statute. The repeated references to the jury's duty to consider the evidence, combined with the instruction's statement that the defendant's allocution is not evidence, created an unacceptable risk that a juror would have felt prohibited from considering the allocution. In the prosecutor's closing argument, however, he asserted that there were three predicates to the felony murder aggravator: second-degree kidnapping, conspiracy to commit first-degree murder, and conspiracy to commit second-degree kidnapping. Bowl Head Haircut, We found that the legislature intended to exclude the prosecutorial consent requirement from section 18-1-406(2) and that because the "right" to waive a jury trial was substantive, the statute not requiring prosecutorial consent prevailed over the court-adopted rule. Although the United States Supreme Court has held that it is permissible under the federal constitution for a state appellate court to uphold a death sentence in a case such as this by applying a harmless error analysis, Clemons v. Mississippi, ___ U.S. ___, ___, 110 S. Ct. 1441, 1456, 108 L. Ed. It is not possible to conclude beyond a reasonable doubt that the jury's decision here did not turn on considerations of the significance of the unconstitutional aggravator alone, especially in view of the prosecutor's emphasis of the evidence in relation to that aggravator. denied, ___ U.S. ___, 110 S. Ct. 291, 107 L. Ed. denied, 435 U.S. 909, 98 S. Ct. 1459, 55 L. Ed. According to *201 the defendant, the prosecutor then improperly relied on this admission in proving the existence of the prior felony convictions as an aggravator. Thus, our examination of the instructions as a whole, as well as the context of the sentencing hearing, leads us to conclude that there is not a "reasonable likelihood" that the jury applied instructions No. 2d 271 (1989) (court rejects "doubling up" argument for aggravators "murder of a witness" and "murder in the course of kidnapping"). Subsections (a) and (b) provide: Further, section 16-11-103(8)(b) provides: Colorado Appellate Rule 4(e) also provides: Appeals of Cases in Which a Sentence of Death Has Been Imposed. Second, the prosecutor presented what was designated Exhibit 108. (v. 26, p. 412) When MacLennan answered that he was not, Becky Davis offered to come by and drop off some used clothes which might be of use to MacLennan's children. Q. 3d 713, 244 Cal. Before considering defendant's specific objections as to the three jurors, it is useful to review the standards this court has adopted regarding challenges for cause. With these principles in mind, we consider the instructions which the defendant challenges in this case. It stated in pertinent part: In Tenneson, we wrote "[t]he qualitatively unique and irretrievably final nature of the death penalty `makes it unthinkable for jurors to impose the death penalty when they harbor a reasonable doubt as to its justness.'" 486 U.S. at 364, 108 S. Ct. at 1859. We have recognized that the power to determine the proper punishment for violations of statutes is legislative and not judicial. Gen., Appellate Section, Denver, Steven L. Bernard, Sp. Although this latter portion of the instruction could be interpreted as negating any requirement of unanimity on a mitigating factor, the instruction can also reasonably be read as internally inconsistent or, more importantly, as negating the unanimity requirement only as to the "outweighing" requirement but not as to the existence of a particular mitigating factor. The co-worker testified that whenever he and Gary Davis repaired the fence closest to the May residence or were otherwise working in that area, Davis made obscene remarks about his sexual desires for various women. Take our quiz and find out. Zant, however, arose in the context of a Georgia death penalty statute that did not contain the balancing features of section 16-11-103(2). While Becky Davis drove, the defendant held Virginia May down in the back seat of the car, removed her clothing, and sexually assaulted her. The Court acknowledged the statement of the Mississippi Supreme Court that: "We likewise are of the opinion beyond a reasonable doubt that the jury's verdict would have been the same with or without the `especially heinous, atrocious or cruel' aggravating circumstance." We reject the defendant's contentions. Coker, 433 U.S. at 592, 97 S. Ct. at 2866. Zant, 462 U.S. at 890, 103 S. Ct. at 2749. 2d 398 (1980). 2d 568 (1988); Lockett v. Ohio, 438 U.S. 586, 604, 98 S. Ct. 2954, 2963, 57 L. Ed. 16-10-103(1)(j), 8A C.R.S. Ingrid loved her children, Sandy and Roger, and her husband, Frank, dearly. In Gathers, similarly, the Court reversed the death sentence after the prosecutor, during closing argument, focused extensively on the character of the victim. *225 The Colorado death penalty statute, 16-11-103, 8A C.R.S. I acknowledge that the phrase "under sentence of imprisonment" in section 16-11-103(6)(a) is perhaps unclear and thus susceptible to more than one meaning. 2d 441 (1989) (court rejects argument that prosecutor's statement that defendant had a right to plead for mercy but that no one could plead for the victim's life was proper argument and did not imply that defendant was not entitled to constitutional rights). *. Enter your email or sign up with a social account to get started, The independent voice of Denver since 1977. [6] As the majority notes, Boyde "used the term `evidence' in a non-technical sense to include all material and circumstances relevant to the jury's sentencing decision." Your email address will not be published. However, the instructions could not possibly have detracted from the clear understanding of the jury that despite those life sentences, if the jury ultimately determined that death was the appropriate sanction, then the defendant would be put to death. (1986) that is, "[t]he class 1 felony was committed by a person under sentence of imprisonment for *220 a class 1, 2, or 3 felony as defined by Colorado law." 2d 384 (1988), the United States Supreme Court vacated a death sentence because the jury instructions and the verdict form reasonably could have been understood by the jury to preclude consideration of any mitigating evidence unless all twelve jurors agreed on the existence of a particular mitigating circumstance. at 193. Explore Life Stories, Offer Condolences & Send Flowers. The defendant argues that the court's refusal to waive the trial by jury requires that his sentence be vacated and that the case be remanded to the trial court for entry of a sentence of life imprisonment. 2d 1065 (1977); State v. Rust, 197 Neb. Guided by these principles, we now address defendant's arguments as to the propriety of the challenges for cause to particular jurors. The failure of the defendant to object to the trial court's delay in resolving the question of consecutive versus concurrent life sentences may well have been part of a calculated strategy to obtain the least severe sentence possible. Id. Thus, the doubling up of aggravators is not legally significant under the Colorado death penalty procedure. 4. A. Copyright Dr Paul Enenche 2018-2020. (v. 15, pp. Unless trial errors are held to require reversal only if they prejudice the defendant, it will be nearly impossible to proceed with trials in capital cases. Wilson v. People, 743 P.2d 415, 420 (Colo.1987).[24]. denied, 420 U.S. 930, 95 S. Ct. 1132, 43 L. Ed. You're all set! I can't give you a straight answer. at 856. As the defendant acknowledges, this court is not well equipped to conduct this sort of "proportionality" review. [34] Instruction No. denied, 465 U.S. 1084, 104 S. Ct. 1455, 79 L. Ed. concurring in judgment). Her friends wouldnt believe if a brave girl like Davis would choose to end her life. denied, ___ U.S. ___, 109 S. Ct. 3175, 104 L. Ed. The exclusion of Olivas was proper under the Witt standard: Olivas' statements indicated that his views on alcohol would "substantially impair the performance of his duties as a juror in accordance with his instruction and his oath." Thus, we declined to overrule Brisbin and upheld the provision of section 16-8-105(2) requiring the consent of the prosecutor to waive a trial by jury in cases where a defendant enters a plea of not guilty by reason of insanity. Herrera pleaded guilty to four murders and was sentenced to four life sentences. We reject the defendant's argument. See above, at 176-177. However, I conclude that this court cannot ascertain from the record in this case what the jury would have done had it not considered the unconstitutional "especially heinous, cruel and depraved" aggravator, much less what the jury would have done had it considered that aggravator together with a limiting instruction it never received. We reject defendant's argument. Q. 2d 346 (1988) and State v. Clark, 108 N.M. 288, 772 P.2d 322 (1989), cert. at 179-180. Right off I can't think of I can't think of anything right off. The majority of this court has not addressed the question of whether, despite the constitutionality of capital punishment under certain circumstances under the federal constitution, our state constitution forbids such punishment. I'm here. For example, on November 8, 1966, the voters were presented with the question of "[s]hall capital punishment be abolished?" [22] Of course the antecedent crime must be one which is not inherent or necessarily incident to murder such as assault or battery, otherwise every murder could be punished by death. Incarcerated felons, for their part, in certain circumstances may feel they have little to lose in committing criminal acts, particularly if they are serving lengthy sentences. First, although Instruction No. denied, 458 U.S. 1122, 102 S. Ct. 3511, 73 L. Ed. Defendant's Brief at p. 44, quoting testimony of El Paso County Deputy District Attorney Steve Henry on H.B. He did not object to this remark at trial and thus it must be reviewed under plain error analysis. 1 stated: Further, the defendant objects to that part of Instruction No. We disagree. Get free summaries of new Colorado Supreme Court opinions delivered to your inbox! The four statutory mitigators which Justice Rovira considered in Drake were numbered and worded identically to the four mitigators now challenged by the defendant. [44] During defense counsel's voir dire of Wolfe, the following exchange occurred between the defense counsel, Wolfe, the prosecutor and the court (v. 21, pp. What is significant is that an instruction that leaves the jury in a state of uncertainty or confusion about the effect of their verdict on the ultimate question of life imprisonment or death is incompatible with the reliability required for a valid death sentence. It rebutted the defendant's implicit argument that a death sentence would provide little comfort to the children by urging that "justice" would indeed provide some comfort. 2d 69 (1986), the Supreme Court has not extended the holding of Batson to include those who harbor reservations about capital punishment. In considering the question of whether capital punishment is inconsistent with the contemporary standards of decency, we cannot ignore the fact that throughout the history of this state, capital punishment has been utilized as the penalty for certain crimes. Maj. op. (k) The class 1 felony was committed for the purpose of avoiding or preventing a lawful arrest or prosecution or effecting an escape from custody. Q. I guess what I need to know is, based on your moral and philosophical beliefs against the death penalty, would be able to fairly be involved in that kind of situation, where you would have to consider the question of death as an appropriate punishment? Also, we have stated that "the Constitution does not require a jury composed of a precise balance of jurors of various philosophical predispositions, but only a jury composed of individual jurors who indicate an ability to set aside any preconceptions they may have and decide the case based on the facts adduced at trial." Maj. op. 32(b) and the precedents of this court clearly establish that a defendant has the right before sentencing to make a statement on his own behalf and to present any information in mitigation of punishment. The Court went on to note that: Zant, 462 U.S. at 887, 103 S. Ct. at 2748 (citations omitted). (v. 24, pp. So also, in Clark, the aggravating circumstance of "murder in the commission of kidnapping" did not necessarily involve the aggravating factor of the "murder of a witness." 36-37) When they pulled into the MacLennans' driveway, they noted the presence of a male ranch hand, which prompted Becky Davis to state to MacLennan that "I thought your husband wasn't home." The emotional state of the defendant at the time the crime was committed. (1978 & 1983 Supp. [41] Following the determination that the defendant was guilty of the charge, the judge then sentenced the defendant. Id. C.A.R. Maj. op. Thus, we reject the defendant's argument that challenges for cause under our current bifurcated sentencing scheme are reviewable under the standard enunciated in Stratton, and instead will consider whether the trial court properly applied the Witt standard.[42]. This instruction does not tell the jury that a single juror could find that a mitigator outweighed an aggravator only if the jury had previously determined unanimously that the mitigator existed. Additional principles apply when reviewing the propriety of jury instructions in the sentencing phase. In the absence of an objection, asking the trial court to exercise its discretion to exclude such evidence, we find no error. A sentence of death cannot be carried out if the jury that imposed the sentence was chosen by excluding prospective jurors for cause simply because they voiced general objections to the death penalty or expressed some degree of conscientious reluctance to impose it. Numerous irregularities, each one of which in itself might not justify reversal, may in the aggregate so affect the substantial rights of an accused as to require reversal. Bradbury's answer, which caused the trial court to excuse him for cause, indicated only that he would not vote for the death penalty based solely on a simple weighing of mitigators and aggravators. 2d 725 (1990), such an approach is inconsistent with Colorado's statutory scheme. 66-69) The sponsors' testimony cited by the defendant is unhelpful on this question. The construction of the terms we adopt today was not given to the jury, and thus we cannot automatically conclude that, in the absence of such instructions, the jury properly applied the law. The defendant objects to certain remarks made by the prosecutor in his closing argument to the jury during the sentencing phase. A. I'm finished. Long, Larry. Thus, the use of such language was impermissible. Under this procedure, the trial court can take full advantage of the procedures of the class 1 sentencing hearing *203 where all of the factors relevant to sentencing are considered. If the specific instruction fails constitutional muster, we then review the instructions as a whole to determine whether the entire charge delivered a correct interpretation of the law. In the absence *216 of a more convincing demonstration than that present here of Bradbury's categorical opposition to capital punishment and his inability to consider the death penalty as a possible penalty in any case whatever, I would hold that, considering the voir dire examination of this juror in its entirety, the trial court's disqualification of Bradbury was premature. Thoughts and Prayers are with all of you. A prospective juror's preconceived belief as to the propriety of capital punishment does not alone provide a sufficient basis to disqualify the juror for cause. In Gathers, the prosecutor in closing argument extensively reviewed the circumstances surrounding the victim's murder in a park. *196 In Caldwell v. Mississippi, 472 U.S. 320, 105 S. Ct. 2633, 86 L. Ed. The defendant also argues that our decision in Young v. People, 175 Colo. 461, 467-68, 488 P.2d 567, 570 (1971), holding that the Witherspoon standard for exclusion of jurors was not "inconsistent with the law of the state," also implies that there is an independent standard under state law. Expand. [1] At the time of the trial, Becky Davis was divorced from Gary Davis and apparently went by the name of Rebecca Fincham. (1986), provided in relevant part: For purposes of this section, aggravating factors shall be the following factors: (a) The class 1 felony was committed by a person under sentence of imprisonment for a class 1, 2, or 3 felony as defined by Colorado law or United States law, or for a crime committed against another state or the United States which would constitute a class 1, 2, or 3 felony as defined by Colorado law; or, (d) The defendant intentionally killed a person kidnapped or being held as a hostage by him or by anyone associated with him; or, (e) The defendant has been a party to an agreement to kill another person in furtherance of which a person has been intentionally killed; or, (g) The defendant committed a class 1, 2, or 3 felony and, in the course of or in furtherance of such or immediate flight therefrom, he intentionally caused the death of a person other than one of the participants; or, (j) The defendant committed the offense in an especially heinous, cruel, or depraved manner; or. Third, the jurors must determine whether the prosecution has convinced them beyond a reasonable doubt that any mitigating factors do not outweigh the statutory aggravating factor or factors previously found to exist. During the initial in-chambers interview, the prosecutor did not offer any challenge to Olivas. 2d 1140 (1982), and Coker v. Georgia, 433 U.S. 584, 97 S. Ct. 2861, 53 L. Ed. We use cookies to collect and analyze information on site performance and usage, and to enhance and customize content and advertisements. (Emphasis added.) 563, 468 A.2d 45 (1983), cert. Defense Bar. Our interpretation of criminal statutes is guided by several principles. 2d 973 (1978), the jury is allowed to consider all mitigating circumstances of the crime. 2 that "it is the weight assigned to each factor, and not the number of factors found to exist that is to be considered." We indeed arent aware of it. Wolfe indicated to the judge that she was "sure he's guilty." There is no requirement that the jury balance aggravating circumstances against mitigating circumstances. The majority rejects the defendant's argument that this instruction (Instruction No. (b) "Depraved" means senseless or committed without purpose or meaning, or that the murder was not the product of greed, envy, revenge, or another of those emotions ordinarily associated with murder, and served no purpose for the defendant beyond his pleasure of killing. As a result of the dispute over the agreement, the Public Defender's office withdrew as counsel for the defendant and the court appointed private counsel to represent him. The legislature might have concluded that the involvement of two or more persons in a plan to take the life of another multiplies the evil in that the depravity of mind requisite to take innocent human life is present not in one person, but in two or more. 14 that a "person on felony parole is by law deemed to be still under sentence of imprisonment for the felony that caused him originally to be sentenced." Any other circumstance which bears on the question of mitigation. Ingrid Davis Obituary Colorado: In the loving memory of Ingrid Davis, we are saddened to inform you that Ingrid Davis, a beloved and loyal friend, has passed away. Further, the defendant argues, the juror determines the weight he or she deems appropriate to the mitigating evidence. Nor is the danger of a conspiratorial group limited to the particular end toward which it has embarked. [29] The defendant's allocution here consisted of a short statement in which he acknowledged his guilt and asked the jury that it sentence him to life imprisonment. Fourth, and finally, if the jury finds beyond a reasonable doubt that any mitigating factors do not outweigh the proven statutory aggravating factors, the jurors must then decide whether the prosecution has convinced each of them beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant should be sentenced to death. Cisneros, 720 P.2d at 985 (emphasis in original). Kentswan Buckwild Davis pleaded guilty to second-degree murder in the July 10, 2002, shooting of Cornelius Twon Dowdell in the parking lot of the Cedar Creek Apartments at 1070 S. Chelton Road. Such consecutive sentences might have convinced the jury, the defendant argues, that death was not an appropriate sentence, particularly as it considered the statutory mitigating circumstance that "the defendant [was] not a continuing threat to society." The court of appeals found that "[s]uch a prohibition does not fall within the ambit of the General Assembly's power to impose reasonable requirements upon the right to waive a trial by jury." I also conclude that this court, in the exercise of its appellate jurisdiction, should not constitute itself as the sentencing court in every death penalty case by independently identifying and then re-weighing aggravating and mitigating factors when requested to do so by the People or by the defendant. 23-24. Brown, 479 U.S. at 542, 107 S. Ct. at 840. Here, the trial court instructed the jury, in pertinent part, that "if you have made unanimous findings that the prosecution has proven beyond a reasonable doubt that one or more aggravating factors exist and that no mitigating factors exist, or that a mitigating factor or factors exists, you must now decide whether the prosecution has proven that any factors in aggravation outweigh any factors in mitigation." We do not believe that the prosecutor's comments in this case implicate the concerns addressed by the Court in its Booth and Gathers decisions. document.getElementById( "ak_js_1" ).setAttribute( "value", ( new Date() ).getTime() ); Enter your account data and we will send you a link to reset your password. 2d 235 (1983), the majority determines that because the same evidence would have been admissible to establish other aggravators, the prosecutor's references to that evidence did not constitute reversible error. Convicted on three counts of first degree murder and sentenced to consecutive LWOP terms for burning their Denver. Rptr. death - ingrid davis preston leecolorado springs obituary , dead - dies - we learnt on jan, 21, 2021, ingrid davis preston leedied with loved ones left in total devastation,, ingrid davis preston leeof colorado springs, has sadly passed away causing so much heartbreak and agony to the beloved family, we are yet to notice the deceased obituary 1, given at the conclusion of the penalty phase of the trial. Id. [27] In Borrego v. People, 774 P.2d 854, 856 (Colo. 1989), we rejected the prosecutor's argument that allocution should not be permitted in capital cases. 4 told the jury that "[t]here is no burden of proof as to proving or disproving mitigating factors." Thus, for the jury to have adopted the defendant's strained interpretation of Instruction No. Cartwright, 486 U.S. at 362, 108 S. Ct. at 1858, quoting Godfrey, 446 U.S. at 422, 100 S. Ct. at 1762. Although there is some support in the record for the defendant's contention that Wolfe would abide by her oath, the other statements, as discussed above, indicated that it was probable that her conscientious scruples would make her unable to consider whether, pursuant to our laws, death was the appropriate sentence in this case. First, the general charge to the jury states that "[n]o single rule describes all the law which must be applied. This language apparently contemplated a change from many decades of procedure where the jury was the sole sentencer and waiver was not permitted. Bsnes Version History, 9. The added measure of deterrence presented through capital punishment, therefore, is appropriately applicable to both classes of felons.[16]. However, by its express terms, that section does not apply to class 1 felonies. Rather, the controlling standard is whether the juror is unable to set aside his or her beliefs and render a verdict based upon the evidence adduced at trial and the court's instructions on the law. The federal constitution requires capital sentencing statutes to permit the sentencing body to consider any relevant mitigating circumstances regarding the defendant's character and background, and the circumstances of the offense. Bell v. United States, 349 U.S. 81, 83, 75 S. Ct. 620, 622, 99 L. Ed. [3] Colorado has had the death penalty since 1861, with the exception of a four-year period between 1897 and 1901 when it was abolished and then restored following three lynchings. The Supreme Court has shown no inclination to reexamine this area of the law. [7] Because of this inability to conduct such a review, the defendant argues we must reverse his death sentence. We now examine the aggravators to which the defendant objects. 7 stated in relevant part: (Emphasis added.) See also McCleskey v. Kemp, 481 U.S. 279, 307, 107 S. Ct. 1756, 1774, 95 L. Ed. Moments From Lauren Boebert, Photos: 35 shocking Colorado murders and the ones targeted with the death penalty, seek the death penalty against Dexter Lewis, killing five people at Fero's Bar & Grill, Dexter Lewis target of death penalty bid for Fero's killing, affidavit describes horrific scene. Brooklyn Duo Sheet Music, It well may be that Gary Lee Davis is deserving of execution in retribution for his crimes. 2d 398 (1980)). denied, 461 U.S. 910, 103 S. Ct. 1886, 76 L. Ed. The defendant had met Gary May on occasion when the two men worked on a fence line between the properties. Ingrid Davisobituary is not public at the time, we will share more as we learn about the obituary and possibly the funeral. E.g., Godfrey v. People, 168 Colo. 299, 451 P.2d 291 (1969); Cokley v. People, 168 Colo. 52, 449 P.2d 824 (1969); Neighbors v. People, 161 Colo. 587, 423 P.2d 838 (1967); Balltrip v. People, 157 Colo. 108, 401 P.2d 259 (1965); Mitchell v. People, 24 Colo. 532, 52 P. 671 (1898). 2d 1354 (1988). at 180. If, for any reason satisfactory to the court, any member or members of the trial jury are excused from participation in the sentencing hearing, the trial judge shall replace such juror or jurors with an alternate juror or jurors. 2d 982 (1977), for the proposition that consonant with the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution "a reviewing court should look at the legislative judgments of other states to determine whether death as a punishment is valid under a particularized set of facts." Gloomhaven Scenario 43 Unlock, August, 1990. Virginia May was stalked, captured, abused and, finally, killed to fulfill the defendant's sexual fantasies. Booth, 482 U.S. at 502-03, 107 S. Ct. at 2534. Third, the court should construe the statute in light of its purpose. Mary G. Allen, Colorado Springs, for amicus curiae Colorado Crim. That section provides: Imposition of sentence in class 1 felonies appellate review. In looking to the legislative history, the majority concedes that the term "under sentence of imprisonment" was intended to "cover persons who are in prison at the time they commit the class 1 felony." The deputy questioned the Davises about the May disappearance, and was told that they knew nothing of her whereabouts. Our review of the cases in this area, as discussed above, convinces us that the court of appeals in Cisneros was incorrect to suggest that the legislature could not forbid a defendant from waiving a jury trial in a capital case. See generally discussion of common law on right to waive jury trial in Singer v. United States, 380 U.S. 24, 27-37, 85 S. Ct. 783, 786-91, 13 L. Ed. The defendant's conduct was hideous, as the prosecutor emphasized in his closing arguments. 1310, Audiotape of Hearing before Senate Judiciary Committee, 54th General Assembly, Second Session, February 29, 1984, 2:06 p.m. Whenever a sentence of death is imposed, the Supreme Court shall review the propriety of the sentence, having regard to the nature of the offense, the character and record of the offender, the public interest, and the manner in which the sentence was imposed, including the sufficiency and accuracy of the information upon which it was based. The type of proportionality review which the defendant argues is required by the state constitution, and which the Court in Harris held was not required by the federal constitution, inquires into whether the punishment imposed is "disproportionate to the punishment imposed on others convicted of the same crime." (1986) (a person on parole who "behaves and conducts himself as not to incur his reincarceration shall be deemed to be still serving out the sentence imposed upon him."). By nearly a 2-1 margin the voters favored retaining the death penalty. Paroled felons by their previous conduct have shown that the law's deterrent effect was insufficient to dissuade them from engaging in criminal acts. Later that year he was permitted to plead guilty to three counts of first-degree murder in exchange for three consecutive life sentences. The prohibition against improperly excusing a juror for cause in a capital sentencing proceeding is grounded in the Sixth Amendment right to a fair trial. workday functional consultant resume, f1 radio frequencies, hyatt regency san francisco club lounge, inglewood shooting 2020, kipp academy uniforms, starling bank opening times, james arthur caan, how to cook elk ham steak, look down my rain barrel, slide down my cellar door, xerox versalink b405 troubleshooting, what does a 47 year old woman look like, moneylion instacash issues, how to recognize a nephilim, queens hotel southsea haunted, sms za kumuumiza mpenzi wako,
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